How Likely Is Factor Price Equalization? by Hansen, Bodil O. & Keiding, Hans
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
How Likely Is Factor Price Equalization?
Hansen, Bodil O.; Keiding, Hans
Publication date:
2008
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Hansen, B. O., & Keiding, H. (2008). How Likely Is Factor Price Equalization? Department of Economics,
University of Copenhagen.
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
Discussion Papers 
Department of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
 
 
 
No. 08-10 
 
 
 
How Likely Is Factor Price Equalization? 
 
 
Bodil O. Hansen 
Hans Keiding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Studiestræde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K., Denmark 
Tel.: +45 35 32 30 82 – Fax: +45 35 32 30 00 
http://www.econ.ku.dk 
 
 
ISSN: 1601-2461 (online) 
 
 
How Likely Is Factor Price Equalization?
Bodil O. Hansen
Copenhagen Business School
Hans Keiding1
University of Copenhagen
February 2008
Abstract
The idea of treating factor price equalization as a situation, where the distribution
of factors among countries is compatible with an equilibrium in an integrated world
economy, has been refined to give the so-called lens condition for factor price
equalization. In this paper, we show that the lens condition may be used to give
estimates for the probability of factor price equalization when factors are distributed
randomly among countries and, in addition, the techologies are sampled according to
a given probability distribution. The estimates indicate that factor price equalization
may occur less often than intuitively conceived.
Keywords: international trade, factor price equalization, lens condition
JEL classification: F11
1. Introduction
The factor price equalization (FPE) theorem, found by Lerner (1952) and Samuelson
(1948, 1949, 1953) is one of the most remarkable achievement of international trade
theory. It says that under suitable – and, as it turns out, rather restrictive – assumptions,
factors of production will obtain the same remuneration in countries trading only in final
products. Subsequent authors have refined and reformulated it in several ways, one of
the most fruitful being the introduction by Dixit and Norman (1980) of the factor price
equalization domain, the set of initial distributions of factors among countries such that
international trade equilibria are identical to equilibria of an integrated world economy
with no restriction on trade in factors.
1 Corresponding author: Hans Keiding, Institute of Economics, Studiestraede 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K,
Denmark. Email: hans.keiding@econ.ku.dk
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Following a geometric approach to FPE domains, Deardorff (1994) formulated the
so-called lens condition for FPE, which points to the role of the factor proportions in the
different sectors which span the FPE domain. The lens condition has been intensively
discussed in the literature, see e.g. Deardorff (2001), Demiroglu and Yun (1999),
Kemp (2001), Kemp and Okawa (1998), Qi (2003), Wong and Yun (2003), Yun (2003),
Chakrabarti (2006), adapting it to various purposes. One of the main advantages of this
approach is that it lends itself easily to geometric reasoning. Intuitively one has that if the
vectors of inputs needed in the different industries in the integrated equilibrium have very
different directions, then the FPE domain will be large relative to the set of all possible
distributions among countries of factor endowments, and if for given world endowment,
each distribution of endowment among countries is considered equally likely, then the
probability of FPE is large.
However, restricting attention to distribution of given endowments, taking world
factor endowment and technology as given, appears as a not very useful approach, and
consequently we shall allow also the technologies for producing the commodities to vary.
More specifically, we assume that endowments as well as technologies are chosen at
random, and we are then interested in the probability of factor price equalization, both for
fixed technology and for the general case. In the textbook case, the resulting assessment of
the probability of factor price equalization is more or less as would be expected, showing
it to occur in close to half of the possible cases; the fact that it is actually less than one
half is due to the method of sampling technologies and may not cause too much concern.
When moving to more than two commodities and factors, things change rapidly, in the
sense that the probability of factor price equalization decreases towards zero with rising
dimension.
This somewhat unexpected result, that factor price equalization becomes increasingly
unlikely as the number of goods and factors increases, is of course in its turn dependent
on the particular way of parametrizing technologies as well as the choice of probability
distribution on parameters. On the other hands, since the assessments are bases on
considerations of volumes of suitable convex sets, that is on Lebesgue measure, they
seem to catch some basic features of the problem, which tend to be overlooked when
considering only low-dimensional cases.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce notation and present a
version of the condition for factor price equalization which largely follows the literature.
Then we turn to our main notion, the probability of factor price equalization, which is
considered in the classical case with equal number of commodities and factors in Section
3, and in Section 4 in the general case. We conclude in Section 5 with some general
comments. A technical result needed in Section 3 is proved in an appendix.
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2. Definitions. The lens condition
In this section, we introduce the main concepts and the notation to be used in the paper.
Also we state a version of the well-known lens condition for factor price equalization which
is adapted to our purpose.
We start by introducing technologies, using support functions of the 1-isoquant. More
specifically, let r = {q ∈ Rr+ |
∑r
h=1 qh = 1} be the set of normalized prices of r
given factors of production, and let Sr be the set of concave functions σ : r → R+.
We parametrize the family of admissible production functions by the elements of Sr,
interpreted as (downwards) support functions of 1-isoquants, so that the upper level set at
output 1 (all factor combinations yielding at least output 1) is
Yσ = {z ∈ Rr+ | ∀q ∈ r, q · z ≥ σ(q)},
and the production function associated with σ is fσ given by
fσ(z) = max{λ | λ−1z ∈ Yσ}.
Since elements of Sr are (support functions of) 1-isoquants, we refer to them as techniques
rather than as production functions.
Let φσ(q) = {z ∈ R | q · z = σ(q)} be the set of cost minimizing vectors of factor
input at the price q. Clearly, for each q ∈ r, the set φσ(q) is closed and convex, and
φσ(q) is a singleton if Yσ is strictly convex.
In the following, a technology is an array σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ (Sr)n consisting of n
elements of Sr. In the interpretation, σ specifies the method of producing n distinct
commodities using the r factors of production. The following standard property of
technologies is a useful consequence of the concavity of the elements of Sr.
Lemma 1. Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ (Sr)n and ω ∈ Rr++ be given, and let
y0 = (y01 , . . . , y
0
n) ∈ Rn++. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) y0 maximizes some quasiconcave and monotonic function U(y) over all y =
(y1, . . . , yn) for which there are z1, . . . , zn ∈ Rr+ with yi = fσi(zi) and
∑n
i=1 zi = ω,
(ii) there is q ∈ r such that
ω ∈
n∑
i=1
y0i φσi(q). (1)
Proof: (i)⇒(ii): Let
X0 = {z ∈ Rr+ | ∃(z1, . . . , zn), U(fσ1(z1), . . . , fσn(zn)) ≥ U(y01 , . . . , y0n)}.
By convexity of production sets and quasi-concavity of U , this set is convex. By our
assumptions, it intersects the set {z ∈ Rr+ | z ≤ ω} only in ω. By separation of convex
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sets, there is q ∈ r such that q · x ≥ q · ω for all x ∈ X0. Using the definition of
X0 we see that for each i, q · zi ≥ q · z0i for all zi such that fσi(zi) ≥ fσi(z0i ), where
fσi(z
0
i ) = y
0
i , each i, and
∑n
i=1 z
0
i = ω.
(ii)⇒(i): Write ω = z1 + · · · + zn with zi ∈ y0i φσi(q) for each i, and define
pi = (q · zi)/y0i . Then by constant returns to scale we have that pifσi(z′i) ≤ q · z′i for all
z′i ∈ Rr+, and it follows that y0 maximizes p·
∑n
i=1 fσi(z
′
i) over all (z
′
1, . . . , z
′
n) ∈ (Rr+)ny
with
∑
i z
′
i = ω, which is (i).
The situation considered in Lemma 1 corresponds to what is called “the integrated
equilibrium” in the literature on factor price equalization (we have considered Pareto
efficient allocations rather than equilibria in an integrated economy, which under our
assumptions amounts to the same). We now proceed to consider the case where total
factor endowments ω are distributed among the K countries according to the array
ω = (ω1, . . . , ωK) ∈ (Rr+)K . The array (σ, ω) is called aK-country world; the associated
1-country world (σ, ω), where ω =
∑K
k=1 ω
k, is called the integrated economy.
An equilibrium in the K-country world (σ, ω) is an array (p, (yk, qk)Kk=1) ∈
n × (r × Rn+)K such that for each k,
yk maximizes p · y over all y such that ωk ∈
n∑
i=1
yiφσi(q
k). (2)
The equilibrium is a factor price equalization equilibrium (FPEE) if qk = ql for
k, l = 1, . . . , K.
In the notation introduced thus far, the “lens condition” for factor price equalization
takes the following form:
Proposition 1. Let (σ, ω) be a K-country world, and let (p, (yk, qk)Kk=1) be an
equilibrium with y0 =
∑K
k=1 y
k
. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) (p, (yk, qk)Kk=1) is an FPEE with q1 = · · · = qK = q,
(ii) there is q ∈ r such that
ωk ∈
n∑
i=1
conv
({0}, y0i φσi(q)) , (3)
for all k.
Proof: (i)⇒(ii): Since (2) holds with qk = q for each k, we have that ωk ∈∑n
i=1 y
k
i φσi(q) for each k, and since y
k
i φσi(q) ⊂ conv
({0}, y0i φσi(q)) for each i and k,
we have (3).
(ii)⇒(i): By (3), the factor endowment ωk has a representation
ωk = zk1 + · · ·+ zkn,
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where zki ∈ yki φσi(q)) for some yki ∈ [0, y0i ], each k, and with y0i =
∑K
k=1 y
k
i for each i.
We then have that
ω =
K∑
k=1
ωk ∈
K∑
k=1
yiφσi(q),
which by Lemma 1 means that (p, (y0, q)) is an equilibrium in the integrated economy for
some p ∈ n. It now follows immediately that (p, (yk, q)Kk=1) is an FPEE.
It should be noticed that the present characterization of FPEEs allows for technologies
for which isoquants may not be smooth. A prominent such case is that of Leontief
technologies: A technique σ ∈ Sr is Leontief if it has the form σa with
σa(q) = q · a
for some a ∈ Rr+. We denote by SLr the set of Leontief techniques. A technology σ is
Leontief if it belongs to
(SLr )n, that is if σi = σai for each i, and the output y0 maximizes
p · y for some p ∈ n using total resources ω if
n∑
i=1
y0i ai ≤ ω
with equality for at least one of the r coordinates. We have that
n∑
i=1
y0i ai =
n∑
i=1
(piy0i )
[
1
pi
ai
]
= p · y0
(
n∑
i=1
piy
0
i
p · y0
[
1
pi
ai
])
,
so that the solution is identical to that of finding maximal output in a one-good economy
with the composite good obtained by valuing n-tuples at prices p and using the technique
σ defined by
σ(q) = min
{
1
p1
σa1(q), . . . ,
1
pn
σan(q)
}
,
and in the solution, q supports each of the points 1pi ai, i = 1, . . . , n.
A similar result holds in the general case, and it provides the link between the classical
approach to FPE, finding the (unique) factor prices corresponding to commodity prices p.
Except for uniqueness, this carries over to our present setup.
Proposition 2. Let (σ, ω) be a K-country world, and let (p, (yk, qk)Kk=1) be an
equilibrium with y0 =
∑K
k=1 y
k
. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) (p, (yk, qk)Kk=1) is an FPEE with q1 = · · · = qK = q,
(ii) there is q ∈ r such that σi(q) = pi for each i and
ωk ∈ (p · yk) conv
({
1
pi
φσi(q)
∣∣ i = 1, . . . , n}) (4)
for each k.
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Proof: (i)⇒(ii): Using property (2) of the equilibrium we get that
ωk ∈
n∑
i=1
piy
k
i
1
pi
φσi(q) = (p · yk)
n∑
i=1
λi
1
pi
φσi(q)
with λi = piyki /(p · yk) for each i, so that (4) holds for each k.
(ii)⇒(i): Suppose that (4) holds for each k. Adding over k we get that
ω = (p · y0)
n∑
i=1
λi
1
pi
zi =
n∑
i=1
λi(p · y0)
pi
zi
with zi ∈ φi(q), each i. Using that q · z′i = σi(q) = pi, all z′i ∈ φσi(q), each i we have
that (q · z′i)/pi is independent of i, so that q must be a support of {zi | fσi(zi) ≥ 1} for
each i, and consequently we may assume that q1 = · · · = qK = q, which is (i).
3. Assessing the probability of FPE: The classical case (r = n)
In this section, we consider the probabilistic approach to factor price equalization
in its classical version where the number of traded commodities equals the number of
factors. We start with the case of only two factors of production, allowing for a graphical
representation using the Edgeworth box. This representation also lends some intuition to
the probability of factor price equalization, in least in the simple case of independent and
uniform distribution of resources, as the relative area of the subset of the box bounded by
the rays of factor inputs in the integrated equilibrium.
For simplicity let the technology be Leontief, with (σ1, σ2) = (σa1 , σa2). If the
technology is fixed, and the commodity prices are given, then the factor equalization
domain can be represented in the Edgeworth box as the area of the set A between the rays
from the origin through a1 and a2 (in the coordinate systems with origin O1 as well as in
that with origin O2), cf. Fig.1.
We assume that factor endowments in each country are drawn independently accord-
ing to a probability distribution F with density f . If Πσ,p is the probability of factor price
equalization, then
Πσ,p =
∫
(z1,z2)∈A
f(z)f(ω − z)dz. (5)
In order to obtain explicit assessments of Πσ,p we assume that F is the uniform distribution
on [0, 1]2, and that ω = (1, 1), so that the expression in (5) equals the area of A. Using the
notation as indicated in Fig.1, we find that the line segment BC has length 2αβ/(α + β),
so that the probability of FPE is
Πσ,p = 2
√
2
αβ
α + β
(6)
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Figure 1
in the case illustrated in Fig.1.
It is evident that the quantity in (6) depends on the technology as expressed here by
the two rays φσ1(q), φσ2(q). Following the probabilistic approach, we would proceed to
take expectations over technologies σ and commodity prices p. This however presupposes
a given probability distribution over the set
(SL2 )2; such a distribution with reasonable
intuitive content does not suggest itself except in the particular case, where all techniques
in S2 are Leontief, and therefore we restrict our treatment to this case.
Thus, we assume that Leontief technologies are parametrized by pairs (a1, a2) of
elements of the simplex {a ∈ R2+ | a1 + a2 = 1} which define the relevant factor
proportions in each of the two techniques. We assume that the two techniques are sampled
in such a way that total factor endowment can be exploited efficiently, meaning that
a11 ≥ 12 , a22 ≥ 12 . The case where one of these inequalities is violated will be considered
separately.
In principle, we need not only factor proportions but also the amount of factors needed
to produce one unit of commodity. However, the factor price equalization domain will be
determined only by factor proportions; the absolute factor productivity will matter only
for the commodity prices, and with our parametrization of technologies, we need not take
the latter into account. We get the following result in the 2× 2× 2 case.
Proposition 3. Consider the family (SL2 )2×{(ω1, ω2) ∈ (R2+)2 | ω1 +ω2 = (1, 1)}
of 2-country worlds with 2 commodities and 2 factors of production, where techniques and
endowments are sampled uniformly given that factors can be used efficiently. Then the
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probability of factor price equalization Π2,2,2 satisfies
Π2,2,2 <
1
2
.
Proof: Using the parametrization u = ‖a1−
(
1
2 ,
1
2
) ‖, β = ‖a2− ( 12 , 12) ‖, we have the
following expression
Π2,2,2 = 2
√
2
∫ √2
2
0
∫ √2
2
0
αβ
α + β
dα dβ.
After substitution of y for α + β we get that
Π2,2,2 = 2
√
2
∫ √2
2
0
∫ β+√22
β
(
1− β
y
)
dy dβ
= 2
√
2
∫ √2
2
0
[√
2
2
β − β2 ln
(
1 +
√
2
2
1
β
)]
dβ
and using Taylor expansion of ln
(
1 +
√
2
2
1
β
)
around ln 1 = 0 we get that
ln
(
1 +
√
2
2
1
β
)
>
√
2
2
1
β
− 1
4β2
,
so that
Π2,2,2 > 2
√
2
∫ √2
2
0
1
4
dβ =
1
2
,
which gives the assessment of the proposition.
The fact that factor price equalization occurs with probability less than 12 may come
as a surprise, since the “average” technology would be that where α = β =
√
2
4 , for which
the area of the factor price equalization domain is exactly 12 . Needless to say, the result
depends on the distribution of techniques; if we had chosen a uniform distribution over the
angles between the diagonal and the factor proportion rays, the cases of instances of small
factor price equalization domains would have weighted less and final probability would
have been greater. However, the approach taken seems more natural from an economic
point of view, using factor bundles rather than factor proportions, and it is much more easy
to generalize to more than 2 factors of production.
For the extension of the results to cases of more than two commodities and factors,
we start by considering the case n = r = 3 (and, as previously, K = 2). With total factor
endowment ω = e = (1, 1, 1), we have that a 2-country world is defined by specifying
three Leontief techniques σa1 , σa2 , σa3 with a1, a2, a3 ∈ 3. By Proposition 2, factor
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price equalization will obtain whenever (ω1, ω2) is such that ωi ∈ cone ({a1, a2, a3}) for
i = 1, 2. Geometrically, this means that ω1 should belong to the set
cone ({a1, a2, a3}) ∩ [{e} − cone ({a1, a2, a3})]. (7)
From this we obtain a bound for the probability of factor price equalization, Π3,3,2, namely
Π3,3,2 ≤ 2Vol (cone ({a1, a2, a3}) ∩ {z ∈ R3+ | Σizi = 1}) , (8)
and this expression may be used to obtain a numerical assessment of the bound. We need
a further notion: Let P3 be the expected value of the area of a triangle spanned by three
points in the simplex 3 chosen at random, measured relative to the area of 3.
Proposition 4. Consider the family (SL3 )3×{(ωi)3i=1 ∈ (R3+)2 | ∑i ωi = (1, 1, 1)}
of 2-country worlds with 3 commodities and 3 factors of production, where techniques and
endowments are sampled uniformly given that factors can be used efficiently. Then the
probability of factor price equalization Π3,3,2 satisfies
Π3,3,2 <
√
3
2
P3 <
√
3
2
(
1
2
)2
. (9)
Proof: Using (8), we have that the relative area of the factor price equalization at any
choice of Leontief technology (σa1 , σa2 , σa3) must be bounded from above by twice the
relative area of
conv({0,
√
3
2
a1,
√
3
2
a2,
√
3
2
a3}) = 12
√
3
2
m(conv({a1, a2, a3}))
m(2) ,
where m(·) denotes area (or Lebesgue measure). Taking expectations over a1, a2, a3 we
get that
Π3,3,2 ≤ 21
2
√
3
2
P3,
and inserting the value of P3 from Lemma 2 (in the appendix), we get (9).
Comparing the expression in (9) to the result obtained in Proposition 3, we notice that
the bound obtained is not exact, being based on the two cones spanned by the techniques
from each of the end points of the (three-dimensional) Edgeworth box, which only in
exceptional cases is identical to the factor price equalization domain. Even so, it is seen
that the probability of factor price equalization is smaller in dimension 3 than in dimension
2. The assessment in dimension 3 can be generalized to higher dimensions with the same
line of proof, which is left to the reader. The key ingredient here as above is assessment of
expected volume of a subsimplex of n obtained by random selection of its verices, the
quantity Pn considered in the appendix.
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Proposition 5. Consider the family (SLr )r × {(ωi)ri=1 ∈ (Rr+)2 | ∑i ωi = e} of
2-country worlds with r commodities and r factors of production, where techniques and
endowments are sampled uniformly given that factors can be used efficiently. Then the
probability of factor price equalization Πr,r,2 satisfies
Πr,r,2 <
√
r
2
Pr <
√
r
2
(
1
2
)r−1
. (10)
Since the bound in (10) has the magnitude of
√
r
2r , it goes to zero for r → ∞. With
a view to the large number of distinct commodities figuring in international trade as well
as the large number of factors of production used in real life, it seems that factor price
equalization is a rather unlikely event. Clearly, one should not overdo the importance of
results as those obtained here, which pertain to a model of international trade which is
anyway lacking in realism. But the result does point to a weakness of the classical theory
which may have given too much attention to a phenomenon turning out to be specific
for the low-dimensional geometric versions of the model. We return to this point in the
concluding remarks.
4. Assessing the probability of FPE: Unequal numbers of commodities and factors
In the present section, we move beyond the classical case of equal number of
commodities and factors of production, so that we have either (i) r > n or (ii) r < n. Case
(i) is rather easily resolved: If q is a common factor price vector, then the factor proportion
vectors φσ1(q), . . . , φσn(q) span a subspace of R
r
+ of less than full dimension, so that the
relative volume of the factor price equalization domain is 0 for all choices of technology.
Thus, more factors than commodities means that factor price equalization is a null event
independent of technology.
(ii) If r < n, the factor endowment of each country must belong to the cone spanned
by φσ1(q), . . . , φσn(q). If K = 2, we get the so-called “lens condition” illustrated in
Fig.2, where the techniques are defined by a1 and a2 as in the case shown in Fig.1, but
where we have an additional technique, for simplicity assumed to belong to the diagonal.
In this case, the factor price equalization domain will depend on commodity prices,
or rather, on the amount of each commodity produced in the integrated equilibrium,
which shows up in the lengths of the vectors φσ1(q), . . . , φσ3(q). This means that for
the assessment of the probability of FPE, we need to take the commodity production into
account.
We shall not consider the general case but restrict our attention to the case illustrated,
where one of the techniques coincide with the diagonal. Then the length of the segment
parallel to the diagonal parametrizes the output in the third technique, and given this length,
10
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the factor price equalization domain is uniquely determined. Compared to the case of only
2 techniques, the area of the FPE domain is reduced by a triangle with top in B (and its
symmetric counterpart). Letting t be the fraction of the distance from B to C which is
not in the FPE domain we have that the probability of FPE, given that a3 =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
can be
found as ∫ √2
2
0
∫ √2
2
0
[
2
√
2
αβ
α + β
−
∫ 1
0
√
2t2
2αβ
α + β
dt
]
dαdβ
=
2
3
∫ √2
2
0
∫ √2
2
0
2
√
2
αβ
α + β
dαdβ =
1
3
,
showing that the impression obtained from the figure is sustained by the computation.
It should of course be stressed that the numerical value of the probability of FPE has
been established only for the special case where one of the techniques coincides with the
diagonal.
5. Concluding remarks
In the present paper, we have considered a probabilistic approach to the phenomenon
of factor price equalization, assessing the likelihood of its occurrence when country
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endowments and the underlying technologies are sampled in a random way. The main
results obtained all point in the same direction, namely that factor price equalization is a
rather unlikely event, with the probability of its occurrence going rapidly to zero when the
number of commodities and factors increase.
As it has been mentioned above, results of this type may not contribute much in a
direct way to our understanding of real life phenomena (where, however, equalization of
factor prices has not been among the first consequences of globalization), but they may
be helpful in our overall assessment of the models used to understand reality. Among
these, the classical trade model has been around for half a century and is still very much
alive. The concept of factor price equalization has been used also in extensions of this
model to cover cases of imperfect competition, where most of the analysis pertains to
situations where endowments are in the factor price equalization domain. The intuition to
be obtained from the present work is that this type of analysis covers only a small part of
what must be expected to occur, a very small part indeed if the results are to be generalized
above the 2 by 2 case.
It might be argued, that the choices of uniform distributions and the restriction to
Leontief technologies are restrictive and have little if any economic content, and this is
largely true, but again the approach should be thought of as supplementing the textbook
intuition obtained in the 2 by 2 case with something that applies to higher dimensions.
This corresponds to the approach taken in geometric probability (see e.g. Santalo´ (1976)),
where lines or convex bodies are sampled at random.
We have considered only the two-country case when deriving bounds for the
probability of factor price equalization. It is easily seen that this probability does not
increase when the number of countries grows. Indeed, for given technology the probability
is bound by the relative area of the FPE domain to the power of K. Since increasing the
number of commodities and factors is more relevant and has a spectacular effect, we
have concentrated on this. It goes without saying that further and sharper bounds can be
obtained by a more detailed analysis.
Appendix: The expected volume of a random subsimplex
In this section, we provide an assessment of Pn, the expected relative volume of a
subsimplex of n the vertices of which are chosen at random. For the one-dimensional
simplex 2 = [0, 1] we have that
P2 =
∫ 1
0
|b− a| dadb =
∫ 1
0
[∫ b
0
(b− a) da +
∫ 1
b
(a− b) da
]
db =
1
3
.
For the higher-dimensional versions, we need some preliminary considerations.
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Lemma 1. Let d ≥ 2 be arbitrary and let T = {x ∈ Rd+ |
∑d
i=1 xi ≤ 1}. Consider the
subsets T (t1, . . . , td) = conv({0, t1e1, . . . , tded}) of T for (t1, . . . , td) ∈ [0, 1]d. Then
∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0
md(T (t1, . . . , td)) dt1 . . . dtd ≤ 12md−1(conv({e1, . . . , ed}),
where md denotes Lebesgue measure in Rd.
Proof: Since m(T (t1, . . . , td)) ≤ m(T (t1, 1, . . . , 1)), the assessment follows directly
after integrating over t1.
As is seen, a much sharper bound could be obtained, depending on the dimension d,
but the present crude bound will suffice for our purposes.
Lemma 2. Let n ≥ 3, and define Pn by
Pn =
∫
a1,...,an∈n
m(conv({a1, . . . , an}))
m(n) .
Then Pn ≤ 132−(n−2).
Proof: By induction in n; for n = 2 the result was proved above. Assume that the
lemma holds for all 2 ≤ k < n, writen = conv({e1, . . . , en}) and consider an arbitrary
subsimplex D = conv({a1, . . . , an}). Discarding cases where e1 belongs to the affine
subspace spanned by a facet of D, we may assume that there is some vertex in D, say
a1, such that D ⊂ D′ = conv({e1, a2 . . . , an}), and we restrict attention to subsimplices
containing e1.
Let aˆi, for i = 2, . . . , n, be the intersection of the rays from e1 through ai with
the facet conv({e2, . . . , en}). Then using Lemma 1 and the fact that relative Lebesgue
measure is invariant under linear maps, we get that
m(conv({e1, a2, . . . , an}))
m(conv({e1, aˆ2, . . . , aˆn})) ≤
1
2
,
and it follows that
m(conv({e1, a2, . . . , an})
m(n) ≤
1
2
m(conv({aˆ2, . . . , aˆn})
m(conv({e2, . . . , en}) ≤
1
2
1
3
2−(n−3) =
1
3
2−(n−2),
where we have used the induction hypothesis.
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